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I. INTRODUCTION
While money laundering has received a significant amount of
attention recently, it is not a recent phenomenon. The concept of
"money laundering" originates from the practice of American
criminal organizations in the 1920s, where coin-laundries
(laundromats) were used as a means of concealing the criminal origin
of their revenues.' What is recent is the level of international concern
regarding money laundering, which has increased significantly since
the 1980s. The result has been the creation of a complex international
and national legal framework over the last twenty-five years that has
developed in a rather haphazard way. The impact of this legal
framework on international arbitration has become a topic of
growing prominence in the field,2 and is the subject of this article.
A. WHAT IS "MONEY LAUNDERING"?
Money laundering has been defined as "the process by which
criminals attempt to hide and disguise the true origin and ownership
of the proceeds of their criminal activities, thereby avoiding
prosecution, conviction, and confiscation of the criminal funds."3
Money laundering generally involves a three-stage process:
4
1. See Peter W. Schroth, Bank Confidentiality and the War on Money
Laundering in the United States, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 369, 375 (1994).
2. For example, in November 2002, the International Chamber of Commerce
Institute of World Business Law held a conference on the topic of "Arbitration -
Money Laundering, Corruption and Fraud." To view the published proceedings,
see ARBITRATION: MONEY LAUNDERING, CORRUPTION4 AND FRAUD (Kristine
Karsten & Andrew Berkeley eds., 2003) [hereinafter ICC PAPERS] (comprising
scholarly articles addressing money laundering from various perspectives
including that of both the arbitrator and the law firm); see also INT'L BAR ASS'N,
8TH ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION DAY: NEW CHALLENGES AND
RECURRING ISSUES IN A CHANGING ARBITRATION WORLD, at http://www.iba
net.org/images/downloads/Geneva%20(18-19%2OMarch).pdf (last visited Sept. 12,
2005).
3. See JOINT MONEY LAUNDERING STEERING GROUP, PREVENTION OF MONEY
LAUNDERING - GUIDANCE NOTES FOR THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 5 (2003).
4. See WORLD BANK & INT'L MONETARY FUND, REFERENCE GUIDE TO ANTI-
MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 1-7
[hereinafter REFERENCE GUIDE], available at http://wwwl.worldbank.org/finance/
html/amlcft/docs/RefGuide_EN/v2/01-Ch0 lEN v2.pdf (last visited Sept. 12,
2005).
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."soaking," "smurfing" or "placing," which is aimed at putting
proceeds from criminal activity into the banking system by way of
cash deposit in local currency;5
9"washing" or "layering," which is aimed at separating the
proceeds from their original source (this is usually achieved through
a series of transactions, including co-mingling of clean and dirty
money);6 and
*"drying" or "integrating," which is aimed at converting the
washed money into legitimate investments.7
B. WHERE DOES INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FIT IN?
The following are but a few examples of how money laundering
can relate to the resolution of international commercial disputes by
arbitration. One example is where criminal organizations have
recourse to international arbitration as the very means of laundering
their money, such as where a commercial dispute is simulated
between two related corporate entities that appear on their face to be
unrelated. Company A commences a fake claim for damages based
on forged evidence against Company B; Company A obtains an
arbitral award for damages against Company B; and Company B
pays damages to Company A out of proceeds obtained from criminal
activity.8 Unlike judicial proceedings, international arbitration offers
at least a degree of confidentiality, the freedom to organize the
proceedings, and the ability to appoint accomplices as arbitrators.
5. See id. at 1-7 (explaining that money launderers often break up the assets
into less conspicuous amounts before they disperse the funds in several bank
accounts).
6. See id. at 1-8 (describing ways in which a money launderer can convert
illegal funds); JAN DALHUISEN, DALHUISEN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL,
FINANCIAL AND TRADE LAW 482 (2004).
7. See REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 4, at 1-9 (claiming that purchasing real
estate, securities, or other luxury goods are common ways to integrate laundered
money).
8. See Kristine Karsten, Money Laundering: How It Works and Why You
Should Be Concerned, in ICC PAPERS, supra note 2, at 19. For an example of a
deliberate scheme involving an award fabricated to defraud creditors' rights and
priorities in bankruptcy, see Lars Heuman & G6ran Millqvist, Swedish Supreme
Court Refuses to Enforce an Arbitral Award Pursuant to the Public Policy
Provision of the New York Convention, 20 J. INT'L ARB. 493 (2003).
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Hopefully, such abuse of the arbitral process is, and will remain,
rare.
More frequent, in the author's experience, are cases where an
apparently legitimate contract ends up in arbitration that, in fact,
involves money laundering. Consistent with the three-stage money
laundering process described above, money laundering can involve
quite ordinary trade transactions, and money laundering schemes
involving the import and export of commodities are not uncommon.
Such transactions can give rise to a wide array of what appear to be
legitimate commercial disputes.9
One such example is where a money launderer acquires
commodities in a foreign country using dirty money at a price
significantly higher than that offered on the spot market. The seller is
so eager to sell its products with an additional margin that it is either
unaware of, or prepared to turn a blind eye to, the dubious origin of
the funds offered as payment. 0 Having acquired the commodities,
the buyer resells them on its home market at the spot price."' This
may result in a loss to the buyer, but that is not a concern because the
money launderer is then able to account for seemingly legitimate
revenues. 12
Another such example, which is one the author has encountered, is
where the purpose of a supposedly legitimate contract is to
illegitimately divert the assets of one party for the benefit of the other
party, and money laundering is used as a part of the scheme. A series
of arbitrations, in which the author was counsel, uncovered the
following scheme:' 3 Company A and Company B entered into a joint
9. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, ANNUAL
REPORT 2002-2003 4., para. 16 (June 20, 2003) [hereinafter FATF ANNUAL
REPORT], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/13/0/34328221.pdf (last
visited Sept. 12, 2005).
10. See Karsten, supra note 8, at 18-20 (explaining that a transaction cost of
20% or more is usually acceptable to the buyer of the commodities since this
allows them to reinvest the funds with little attention).
11. See id. at 21-22. The spot price is the delivery price of a given commodity
on the market. Investor Words, Glossary, at http://www.investorwords.com
/4663/spot-price.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2005).
12. See Karsten, supra note 8, at 19-20.
13. See diagram, infra.
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venture agreement whereby Company A agreed to invest in
Company B in exchange for a share of the profits from Company B's
business. Company A obtained funds from Company C in order to
make the investment. Company C meanwhile entered into contracts
with Company B to buy commodities at prices lower than those on
the spot market. Company C sold the commodities for a profit and
used some of the profit to lend the necessary funds to Company A
for the investment in Company B, forgiving the loan as a bad debt.
Company A thus obtained a share of Company B's profits by
investing money that Company C had illegitimately diverted from
Company B, and Company A did not have to pay the "loaned"
investment money back to Company C.
When Company B distributed Company A's share of the profits
from the joint venture, Company A funneled some of those profits to
Company C. Company C, therefore, had initial profit obtained from
the sale of commodities and profits obtained from the joint venture.
Then the individuals behind the scheme extracted these illegitimate
profits from Company C by way of, among other things, Company C
credit cards used for personal expenses.
"Investment"
CompanyA 1 4 Profits 1 Company B
Profits "L(o an '  Undervalued
Commodities
Company C|
Credit Cards
Individuals:
This particular scheme, which involved money laundering as
defined above, was in fact even more complex. It involved several
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other corporate entities that had entered into numerous transactions
with Company B, all intended to illegitimately divert Company B's
assets. It also involved a second joint venture between Company A
and Company B. International arbitration exposed this scheme when
new owners acquired Company B, and the new management
terminated the two joint ventures with Company A. Each joint
venture agreement contained an arbitration clause, and Company A
commenced arbitrations against Company B for breach of each joint
venture agreement and damages.
C. How SHOULD AN ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL PROCEED IF A
CONTRACT INVOLVES MONEY LAUNDERING BUT IS VALID AND
ENFORCEABLE UNDER ITS GOVERNING SUBSTANTIVE LAW?
What should an arbitral tribunal do if a contract involves money
laundering, but, as one party argued in the series of arbitrations
described above, the contract is valid and enforceable under its
governing substantive law? One view is that an arbitral tribunal
should not "turn a blind eye" but, rather, should find a way to refuse
to give effect to such a highly objectionable contract. 4 If so, how
should an arbitral tribunal proceed?
The present article does not attempt to answer this question
definitively. It explores three different options open to an arbitral
tribunal confronted with such a scenario to hold the contract invalid
or unenforceable: (a) to refuse jurisdiction over the dispute, (b) to
apply a principle of international public policy, or (c) to give
precedence to the mandatory provisions of another law over the
governing substantive law of the contract.'5
14. See Westacre Investments Co. v. Jugoimport-SPDR Holding Co. Ltd.,
[1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 111, 131 (Q.B.).
15. This article does not address the question of the standard of proof required
to prove money laundering before an international arbitral tribunal. Some consider
the necessary requirement of proof to be "clear and convincing" evidence, which is
a standard of proof higher than "by a preponderance of the evidence," but lower
than "beyond a reasonable doubt." For a further discussion on this subject, see ICC
PAPERS, supra note 2, at 172-77 (examining generally the debate that followed the
ICC Conference). For more information regarding burden and standard of proof
before international tribunals, see generally MOJTABA KAZAZI, BURDEN OF PROOF
AND RELATED ISSUES: A STUDY ON EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNALS 39 (1996).
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Before addressing these options, it is necessary to consider the
existing legal framework in connection with money laundering. It is
this legal framework that arbitrators should have in mind when
considering what to do when faced with a dispute involving money
laundering.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The following overview of the international and national legal
framework regarding money laundering is intended to demonstrate
how this legal framework has evolved over the last twenty-five years
and is not meant to be exhaustive.
A. INTERNATIONAL
Since a 1980 recommendation of the Council of Europe,
16
international bodies have given money laundering a significant
amount of attention. These international institutions consider
international cooperation more important because of the effect of
globalization on money laundering. 7 In general, institutional
agreements take a two-pronged approach. First, the agreement
criminalizes money laundering. Second, it imposes duties on
intermediaries-most notably banks, but also, more recently,
accountants and lawyers.
1. International Conventions
In 1988 in Vienna, the United Nations Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs: and Psychotropic Substances ("Vienna
Convention") was signed. 18 It has been ratified by 170 countries. 9
16. Recommendation No. R (80) 10 of the Committee of Ministers to Member
States on Measures Against Transfer and the Safekeeping of Funds of Criminal
Origin [Mesures contre le transfert et la mise d l'abri des capitaux d'origine
criminelle], Committee of Ministers, 321st mtg. (1980) [hereinafter
Recommendations].
17. See Herbert V. Morais, The Quest for International Standards: Global
Governance vs. Sovereignty, 50 U. KAs. L. REV. 779, 790 (2002) (explaining that
globalization has created competition in financial markets, which could reward
countries that offer lax regulatory schemes with valuable foreign investment).
18. Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 164, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.82/14 (1988),
reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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Pursuant to Article 3 of the Vienna Convention, signatories agree to
establish as criminal offences:
(1) "The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such
property is derived" from drug trafficking offences, "or from an act
of participation in such offence or offences, for the purpose of
concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of
assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such an
offence or offences to evade the legal consequences of his actions; 20
(2) "The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source,
location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership
of property, knowing that such property is derived from [a drug
trafficking offence or from an act of participation in such an offence
or offences]; '' 21 and
(3) "The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing...
that such property, was derived from [a drug trafficking offence]"
(adoption of this third offence is subject to each signatory's
"constitutional principles and basic concepts of its legal system."). 22
While Article 3 of the Vienna Convention only criminalizes
money laundering of proceeds from drug trafficking, drug trafficking
being the "predicate offence" (i.e., the offence that generated the
proceeds which were laundered), it has served as a blueprint for
subsequent initiatives to combat money laundering. For example, the
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime
("Palermo Convention"), opened for signature in Palermo on
November 15, 2000, requires signatories to, in similar terms to
Article 3 of the Vienna Convention, criminalize the laundering of'the
proceeds of "serious crime. ' 23 The Convention defines "serious
crime" as "conduct constituting an offence punishable by a
19. See United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, Monthly Status of Treaty
Adherence (listing the signatories to the Vienna Convention), available at
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaty-adherence.html#1988 (last modified Jan. 1,
2005).
20. Vienna Convention, supra note 18, art. 3(l)(b)(i).
21. Id. art. 3(1)(b)(ii).
22. Id. art. 3(c)(i).
23. G.A. Res. 22, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Annex 1, art. 6, U.N. Doc.
AJRES/55/25 (2000), reprinted in 40 I.L.M. 335 [hereinafter Palermo Convention].
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maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more
serious penalty. 24 This has broadened the range of predicate
offences upon which the prosecution of money laundering may be
based.25
In addition, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials, opened for signature in Paris on December 17, 1997,
requires signatories to make bribery of foreign public officials a
predicate offence when local law considers bribery of domestic
officials a predicate offence. 26 The United Nations Convention on the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, opened for signature on
January 10, 2000, also addresses money laundering as it relates to the
financing of terrorism.27
2. Group of Seven: FATF Forty Recommendations
At its 1989 Paris summit, the Group of Seven 28 established a
special body to cope with the issue of money laundering-the
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering ("FATF"). The
FATF's principal mandates are to spread awareness of the problem
of money laundering and to monitor current money laundering trends
and potential counter-measures. 29 It was also conceived as a "policy-
24. Id. art. 2(b).
25. Cf Vienna Convention, supra note 18, arts. 2-3 (limiting the scope of
predicate offences to those types discussed in the Convention).
26. See S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-43, art. 7 (1998).
27. G.A. Res. 109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. AIRES/54/109 (1999),
reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 270. For a review of the relationship between the
frameworks used for combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism,
see Bruce Zagaris, The Merging of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-
Terrorism Financial Enforcement Regimes After September 11, 2001, 22
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 123 (2004).
28. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.
29. See Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Mission, at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,2966,en_32250379_322368461_1_1_1_1 ,00.ht
ml (last visited Sept. 16, 2005).
1029
AM. U. INT'L L. RE V.
making" body, a role in which it has been particularly successful.3 °
The FATF has developed a set of recommendations, the so-called
"Forty Recommendations," addressed to governments and other
institutions, and updated regularly to take account of new
developments in the field (the most recent update was in 2003).31
Although they lack binding force, the Forty Recommendations are
often presented as the benchmark for national money laundering
policies.32
Pursuant to Recommendation 1 of the Forty Recommendations,
countries are encouraged to criminalize money laundering on the
basis of the Vienna and Palermo Conventions.33 The FATF
recommends that the offence of money laundering be applied to "all
serious offences, with a view to including the widest range of
predicate offences."34 Most of the Forty Recommendations urge
member countries to impose various obligations (most notably,
reporting, customer due diligence, and record-keeping obligations)
on financial institutions and some other non-financial businesses and
professionals.35
30. See Rebecca Gregory, The Lawyer's Role: Will Uncle Sam Want You in the
Fight Against Money Laundering and Terrorism?, 72 U. Mo. KC L. REv. 23, 31
(2003).
31. See Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, The Forty
Recommendations (June 20, 2003) [hereinafter Forty Recommendations], available
at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/38/47/34030579.PDF (last visited Sept. 15,
2005).
32. See Gregory, supra note 30, at 31-32; see also Financial Action Task Force
on Money Laundering, Annual Review of Non-Cooperative Countries or
Territories, at 3 (June 20, 2003), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd
/4/30/33922392.PDF (last visited Sept. 15, 2005).
33. See Forty Recommendations, supra note 31, at 1 (allowing member
countries to determine whether to implement this categorically or as a threshold).
A categorical approach would entail a list of crimes that would serve as the
predicate offence, while a threshold approach would set a minimum level of
punishment as the determining measure. Id.
34. Id. (suggesting, at a minimum, that all "serious offences" under local law as
well as all crimes punishable by a maximum penalty of more than one year
constitute predicate offences to trigger money laundering statutes).
35. Id. at 2-8 (addressing Recommendations 4 through 25 to non-government
entities, and even requiring them to take prospective action to combat threats that
may arise with the development of new technologies).
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In 2000, the FATF identified and blacklisted certain countries and
territories that had proved reluctant to cooperate in the global fight
against money laundering-the so-called Non-Cooperative Countries
and Territories ("NCCTs").36 The necessary incentive to cooperate
has been provided by threats of counter-measures by FATF's
members, such as restrictions on financial transactions. 37 The number
of countries identified as NCCTs has dropped from the twenty-three
first listed in the FATF's 2000 report to three as of February 11,
2005.38
3. European Union39
In 1990, ten years after the 1980 recommendation of the Council
of Europe discussed above,40 the Council of Europe adopted the
Convention on Laundering, Tracing, Seizure and Confiscation of
Proceeds from Crime ("Council Convention").4  The Council
Convention has been ratified by some forty States, including non-
members of the Council such as Australia.42 The key feature of the
36. See Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Review to Identify
Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories, at 2 (June 22, 2000), available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/56/43/33921824.pdf (last visited Sept. 12,
2005).
37. See Todd Doyle, Cleaning Up Anti-Money Laundering Strategies: Current
FATF Tactics Needlessly Violate International Law, 24 HoUS. J. INT'L L. 279, 298
(2002) (arguing that, while the threat of "ultimate recourse" has been successful in
encouraging nations to comply, taking the threatened action would violate the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).
38. See Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Current NCCT
List (noting that Myanmar, Nauru, and Nigeria are the only remaining non-
compliant nations), at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/4/0,2340,en_32250379
32236992_33916420_1_1_1 1,00.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2005).
39. Other regional organizations have also been active in the field. See
Organization of American States, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control
Commission, Model Regulations Concerning Laundering Offences Connected to
Illicit Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Offences, available at
http://www.cicad.oas.org/lavado-activos/eng/Model-regula-eng 12_02/REGLAM
ENTO%20LAVADO%20-%20ING%20ju104.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2005).
40. Recommendations, supra note 16.
41. Nov. 8, 1990, Europ. T.S. No. 141, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 148 [hereinafter
Council Convention].
42. See Council of Europe, Chart of Signatures and Ratifications (noting that
important countries that have not signed include Canada and the United States),
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Council Convention is that it requires signatories to extend the scope
of the offence of money laundering to the proceeds of serious
offences other than drug trafficking. 3 However, determining the
relevant "predicate offences" is left to the discretion of the
signatories."
On June 10, 1991, the Council of the European Communities
adopted the Directive on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial
System for the Purpose of Money Laundering ("First EU
Directive").45 With reference to international instruments such as the
Vienna Convention and the Council Convention, the First EU
Directive follows a two-pronged approach requiring Member States
to criminalize money laundering and to impose a number of
obligations on credit and financial institutions.46 Credit and financial
institutions are required to apply the "Know Your Customer"
principle and to carry out identification of their clients. 47 The First
EU Directive also imposes certain record-keeping, investigation and
reporting obligations. 48 Furthermore, the First EU Directive prohibits
tipping-off (i.e., unwarranted disclosure of reporting to the client),
and includes a safe-harbor provision that protects credit and financial
institutions against potential claims for breach of confidence.49
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=141&
CM=2&DF=2/27/05&CL=ENG (last visited July 27, 2005).
43. Council Convention, supra note 41, art. 6.
44. Id. art. 6.4.
45. Council Directive 91/308/EEC, 1991 O.J. (L 166) 77 [hereinafter First EU
Directive] (seeking to obtain European Community action against money
laundering and the proceeds of criminal activity, while striking a balance with the
Community's goal of achieving a single market).
46. Id. arts. 2-3 (mandating that each Member State prohibits money
laundering in addition to imposing detailed identification measures on financial
institutions when customers open new accounts, transact large sums of money, or
conduct suspicious transactions).
47. Id. art. 3 (providing narrow exceptions to the identification requirement for
pension schemes and certain financial institutions).
48. Id. arts. 4-6.
49. Id. arts. 8-9 (explaining that the success of money laundering investigations
depends on the good faith cooperation of financial institutions).
[20:10211032
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Originally, the scope of the First EU Directive was limited.50 It
was only concerned with the proceeds from offences recognized by
the Vienna Convention (i.e., proceeds from drug trafficking),
although Member States were free to broaden the scope of offences
covered.5 However, the First EU Directive was amended on
December 4, 2001 by a Directive of the European Parliament and the
Council of the European Union ("Second EU Directive").52 The
scope of the Second EU Directive is wider with respect to (i)
predicate offences, and (ii) institutions and persons subject to the
various obligations. The Second EU Directive now covers laundering
of proceeds from "serious crimes," which must include the activities
of criminal organizations, serious fraud, corruption, and offences that
are severely punished under the penal law of the Member State.53
The various obligations provided for under the First EU Directive are
now imposed on a broader array of institutions and professionals,
including real estate agents, auditors and lawyers.54
On June 30, 2004, the European Commission proposed a third
directive ("Third EU Directive"), which would further amend the
First EU Directive to take account of the 2003 update of the FATF's
Forty Recommendations.55 Among other things, the Third EU
Directive contemplates extending the scope of predicate offences to
50. Compare First EU Directive, supra note 45, at 79, art. 1 (defining "criminal
activity" as a crime specified in the Vienna Convention or as designated as a
criminal act by the Member State), with Council Directive 2001/97/EC, art. 1,
2001 O.J. (L 344) 76, 77 [hereinafter Second EU Directive] (determining that
"criminal activity" includes a violation of a crime specified in the Vienna
Convention, fraud, corruption, offences that generate substantial proceeds and are
punishable by imprisonment, the activities or criminal organizations as defined in
Article 1 of Joint Action 98/733/JHA, and any other offence that the Member State
designates as a criminal activity).
51. See First EU Directive, supra note 45, at 78, art. 1 ("'Criminal activity'
means a crime specified in Article 3(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention and any other
criminal activity designated as such for the purposes of this Directive by each
Member State.").
52. See Second EU Directive, supra note 50.
53. See id. at 78, art. I(E).
54. See id. at 78-79, art. 2.
55. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money
Laundering, Including Terrorist Financing, COM(04)448 final.
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include terrorist activities and all offences which are punishable by
deprivation of liberty or a detention order for a maximum of more
than one year. 6 The Third EU Directive was approved by the
European Parliament on May 26, 2005 and was adopted by the
European Council of Economic and Finance Ministers on June 7,
2005. 57 Publication of the Third EU Directive is expected to take
place towards the end of 2005.18 Member States of the European
Union have agreed to implement the Third EU Directive within two
years after its publication. 9
B. NATIONAL
Specific national legal frameworks complement the diverse
international bodies addressing money laundering. This section
provides a description of the legal frameworks in three different
countries-the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.
1. United States
The first money laundering offences in the United States were
created by the Money Laundering Controls Act of 1986.60 Section
1956 of the U.S. Code criminalizes the conduct of financial
transactions involving the proceeds of "specified unlawful activity"
and aiming at (i) promoting the carrying on of "specified unlawful
activity," (ii) concealing or disguising the proceeds of "specified
unlawful activity," or (iii) avoiding transaction reporting
requirements. 6  Section 1956 also prohibits international
transportation of monetary instruments representing proceeds of
56. See id.
57. See Press Release, European Commission, Adoption of Anti-Money
Laundering Directive Will Strike a Blow Against Crime and Terrorism (June 7,
2005), available at http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?refer
ence=IP/05/682&format--HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=fr (last
visited Sept. 15, 2005).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (2000). For a thorough discussion, see Peter J.
Kacarab, An In Depth Analysis of the New Money Laundering Statutes, 8 AKRON
TAXJ. 1 (1991).
61. § 1956(a).
1034 [20:1021
2005] INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MONEYLAUNDERING
"specified unlawful activity. 6 2 Offenders are liable to be fined or
imprisoned for up to twenty years.63 Section 1957 criminalizes the
conduct of "monetary transactions" for an amount exceeding
$10,000 in property derived from "specified unlawful activity." 64
Offenders are liable to be fined or imprisoned for up to ten years.65
The term "specified unlawful activity" includes a wide range of
serious offences, including offences against foreign nations, with the
notable exception of tax evasion.66
Reporting obligations have long been imposed on banks. As early
as 1970, the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act
67
(and the Bank Secrecy Act 6s) provided for the reporting of large
physical currency transactions. In 1992, the Annuzio-Wylie Anti-
Money Laundering Act imposed reporting "suspicious transactions"
in a number of circumstances and obliged banks to keep records of
wire-transfers. 69 The overall framework was further developed in
2001 when Congress passed the U.S.A. Patriot Act.7°
62. Id.
63. Id. (determining that a violation of Section 1956 could also include
punishment in the form of a fine of not more than $500,000 or "twice the value of
the property involved in the transaction, whichever is greater").
64. § 1957(a).
65. § 1957(b).
66. § 1956(c)(7); see Kacarab, supra note 60, at 12 (noting the clear intent of
Congress to establish broad reaching money laundering statutes with respect to the
types of criminal activity included, and discussing the exclusion of tax evasion).
67. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970).
68. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1118 (1970); see also 31 C.F.R. 103 (2004).
69. See Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 4044 (1992) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12, 18 & 31 U.S.C.) (implementing the mandatory recording
of wire transfers and international transactions, the reporting of suspicious
transactions and the integration of anti-money laundering policies and training at
financial institutions in an attempt to combat the pervasiveness of money
laundering).
70. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
315, 115 Stat. 272, 308-09 (2001).
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2. United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, a self-contained piece of legislation called
the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 ("PCA") was adopted on July 24,
2002.71 It brings together the provisions relating to the laundering of
the proceeds of drug trafficking and other crimes previously
contained in the Drug Trafficking Act 199472 and the Criminal
Justice Act 1988. 73
The PCA is a detailed piece of legislation. Sections 327 to 330 set
out three different offences punishable by a maximum penalty of
fourteen years imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine.74 Section 327
of the PCA makes it an offence for a person to conceal, disguise,
convert, transfer or remove criminal property from the United
Kingdom. 75 The provision defines "criminal property" as a person's
benefit from criminal conduct or property which represents such
benefit and where the alleged offender knows or suspects that the
property is such.76 The broad definition of "criminal conduct"
includes any conduct giving rise to a criminal offence in the United
Kingdom or, in respect to conduct outside the United Kingdom,
anything which would have constituted an offence in the United
Kingdom had it been committed there.77 The scope of predicate
offences is accordingly very broad."8
71. c. 29, pt. 7.
72. c. 37, pt. III, § 49.
73. c. 33, pt. VI, § 93A.
74. Proceeds of Crime Act §§ 327-30 (criminalizing offences such as
concealing criminal property, entering into an arrangement with an individual
suspected of facilitating the use or control of criminal property, and acquiring,
using and possessing criminal property).
75. Id. § 327 (stating that concealing or disguising criminal property includes
less culpable action such as concealing the source, location, or ownership of such
property).
76. Id. §§ 340(1), (3), (9).
77. Id. §§ 340(1), (11) (defining money laundering as any offence defined in
the Proceeds of Crime Act, Sections 327, 328 or 329, aiding, abetting, counseling
or procuring the commission of those offences or an attempt, conspiracy, or
incitement to commit any of the offences in Sections 327 through 329).
78. Id. § 340(4).
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Section 328 of the PCA makes it an offence for a person to enter
or become concerned in an arrangement which he or she knows or
suspects facilitates the acquisition, retention, use or control of
criminal property by or on behalf of another person. 9 Section 329
makes it an offence for a person to acquire, use or possess criminal
property.80 This section contains a defense that protects persons
acquiring, using, or having possession of the relevant property for
adequate consideration.8" However, the provision of goods and
services which a person knows or suspects to be assisting a third
party to carry out criminal conduct does not qualify for this
defense.82 Moreover, the defense is not available where the
consideration paid in respect to goods is significantly less than the
value of the property concerned.83
The PCA also implements the provisions of the First EU Directive
on the reporting of suspicious transactions and the prohibition
against tipping-off.84 Failure to comply with these obligations is a
criminal offence punishable by a maximum penalty of five years
imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine.85
79. Id. § 328(1).
80. Id. § 329(1).
81. Id. § 329(2) (allowing an individual to use the defense that he or she made
an authorized disclosure regarding such property or knowledge of such property, or
intended to make disclosure and had a reasonable excuse for not disclosing).
82. Id.
83. Id. §§ 329(3)(a)-(b).
84. Id. §§ 330-31 (requiring disclosure in a variety of instances, and setting
forth the offence of failure to disclose which is conditioned on three factors:
suspicion or knowledge that another person is engaged in money laundering, which
became known to the individual through business in the regulated sector, and the
individual does not disclose as soon as possible). The Act does not deem a person
to have committed the offence of "tipping off' if the person did not know that his
disclosure would be prejudicial to the investigation or if he disclosed in the process
of carrying out an enforcement role. Id. § 333.
85. Id. § 334(2).
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3. France
In 1987, France made the laundering of proceeds from drug
trafficking a punishable offence.86 Some nine years later, in 1996,
France amended its Criminal Code to include the general offence of
money laundering.87 Article 324-1 of the Criminal Code now reads:
"Le blanchiment est le fait de faciliter, par tous moyens, la
justification mensong~re de l'origine des biens ou des revenus de
l'auteur d'un crime ou d'un delit ayant procur ci celui-ci un profit
direct ou indirect." ["Money laundering consists of facilitating by
any means the disguise of the true source of property or income of
the author of a crime that procured for the author of the crime a
direct or indirect profit."].
French law does not limit the scope of the money laundering
offence to certain types of predicate offences. Rather, any offence
punishable by imprisonment qualifies as a predicate offence. Under
the French Criminal- Code, money laundering is punishable by a
maximum penalty of five years imprisonment and/or a fine. Under
certain circumstances (repeated money laundering activities,
activities of a criminal organization, or drug trafficking), money
laundering is punishable by a maximum of ten years imprisonment
and/or a fine. The language of the French Criminal Code is broad. Its
lack of detail has been criticized as being a source of uncertainty,
which, so far, has not been remedied by a consistent body of case
law.88
With respect to obligations imposed on intermediaries, the
provisions of the First and Second EU Directives have been
implemented in the French Financial and Monetary Code.89 The
reporting obligations are limited to the laundering of proceeds of
86. Law No. 87-1157 of December 31, 1987 [Loi 87-1157 relative 6 la lutte
contre le trafic des stupffiants et modifiant certaines dispositions du Code P~nal
(31 d6cembre 1987)].
87. Law No. 96-392 of May 13, 1996 [Loi 96-392 relative d la lutte contre le
blanchiment et le trafic des stupffiants et dt la coopration internationale en
matijre de saisie et de confiscation des produits du crime (13 mai 1996)].
88. See generally Bernard Bouloc, Aspects Juridiques du Blanchiment, 23-24
GAZETTE DU PALAIS 13 (2004).
89. Code Monetaire et Financier [C. MON. FIN.], tit. VI, bk. V.
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drug trafficking or other activities of a criminal organization. 90
Failure to report has not been made an offence in France; instead, it
entails disciplinary sanctions. By contrast, tipping-off is punishable
by a fine.91
III. IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
The question posited in Part I above is how an arbitral tribunal
should proceed if faced with a dispute where the contract at issue,
which involves money laundering, is valid and enforceable under its
governing substantive law. As noted above, this question must be
considered in light of the legal framework regarding money
laundering described above in Part II.
This Part explores three different ways in which an arbitral
tribunal confronted with this scenario can hold a contract invalid or
unenforceable: (a) by refusing jurisdiction over the dispute, (b) by
applying a principle of international public policy, or (c) by giving
precedence to the mandatory provisions of another law over the
governing substantive law of the contract. 92
A. JURISDICTION
Should an arbitral tribunal in such a situation refuse jurisdiction on
the basis that a dispute involving money laundering is not arbitrable?
While arbitrators have no jurisdiction to impose criminal sanctions
on a party, this question concerns the contractual or "civil law"
consequences of money laundering. 93 An analogy can be drawn with
cases involving claims of corruption or bribery. 94 In each case, the
90. Id. art. L. 562-2.
91. Id. art. L. 574-1.
92. As noted supra note 15, this article does not address the question of the
standard of proof required to prove money laundering before an international
arbitral tribunal.
93. See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 7 (4th ed. 2004).
94. See id. at 142.
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first issue is whether the arbitrators have jurisdiction to consider
claims based on the illegality of the underlying contract.95
With respect to corruption, this issue was debated following the
well-known arbitral decision in 1963 of Judge Lagergren in
International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") Case No. 1110.96
Confronted with allegations and evidence that the contract between a
British company and an Argentine intermediary contemplated
bribing Argentine public officials, Judge Lagergren, acting as sole
arbitrator, found that he did not have jurisdiction to decide the merits
of the case.97 In his words, by entering into such an objectionable
contract, the parties "have forfeited any right to ask for assistance of
the machinery of justice (national courts or arbitral tribunal) in
settling their disputes." 98
For some time, Judge Lagergren's findings were referred to in
support of the position that corruption, and, more generally, illegality
claims, are not arbitrable. 99 However, the tide with respect to
arbitrability seems to have turned, not least because the approach of
refusing jurisdiction provided unscrupulous defendants with a wealth
of delay tactics by simply alleging, inter alia, corruption or bribery 00
95. See id. at 143 (determining that generally an allegation of illegality itself
does not preclude the tribunal of jurisdiction).
96. See ICC Case No. 1110, Award, reprinted in J. Gillis Wetter, Issues of
Corruption Before International Arbitral Tribunals: The Authentic Text and True
Meaning of Judge Gunnar Lagergren's 1963 Award in ICC Case. No. 1110, 10
ARB. INT. 277, 291 (1994).
97. Id. at 291-94.
98. Id. at 294.
99. See FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 354 (E. Gaillard & J. Savage eds., 1999) [hereinafter FOUCHARD].
100. See Richard Kreindler, Aspects of Illegality in the Formation and
Performance of Contracts, in INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 209, 216 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2003) (explaining that in
cases where the party seeking relief through arbitration is the party that committed
the illegality, the tribunal seemingly has two choices: condone the illegality by
accepting jurisdiction in order to find against the non-performing defendant or
deny jurisdiction due to illegality and essentially abscond the defaulting
defendant).
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For example, in 1993, the issue of jurisdiction was dealt with by
the Swiss Federal Tribunal in Nat'l Power Corp. v. Westinghouse.10'
In that case, the Swiss Federal Tribunal dismissed a challenge
brought against an arbitral award, noting that the arbitral tribunal had
concluded that corruption allegations had not been proven after a
detailed review of the evidence on the record. The Swiss Federal
Tribunal rejected the Lagergren approach to jurisdiction and held
that the arbitral tribunal had jurisdiction to determine whether acts of
corruption had in fact occurred.
In addition, in 1998, in Westacre Investments Inc. v. Jugoimport-
SPDR Holding Co. Ltd., the High Court of England and Wales was
confronted with a similar issue when requested to enforce an ICC
award made in Switzerland."°2 Westacre and Jugoimport entered into
a "consultancy" agreement whereby Westacre agreed to assist
Jugoimport in obtaining defense contracts from the government of
Kuwait. 103 Westacre commenced arbitration to obtain payment of its
fees under the agreement, and Jugoimport resisted the claim arguing
that the agreement contemplated bribing Kuwaiti officials.' °4 The
arbitral tribunal accepted jurisdiction, but found the allegations of
bribery unsubstantiated." 5 In accepting jurisdiction to enforce the
award, the High Court of England and Wales stated:
It is necessary to consider both on the one hand the
desirability of giving effect to the public policy against
enforcement of corrupt transactions and on the other hand the
public policy of sustaining international arbitration
agreements. One consequence of the arbitrators being
accorded jurisdiction might be that they gave effect to a
101. Tribunal Federal, Lere Cour Civile, Recours de Droit Public du 2
Septembre 1993, National Power Corporation (Philippines) c/ Westinghouse
(USA), 12 ASA BULL. 244 (1994).
102. Westacre Investments Inc. v. Jugoimport-SPDR Holding Co. Ltd., [1998] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 111, 114 (Q.B.) (citing the defendants' grounds for challenging the
enforcement of the award as contrary to public policy).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 115-16.
105. Id. at 117 (refusing to invalidate jurisdiction due to the agreement's
infringement on public policy, and finding that the defendants failed to establish
their claims that the agreement was void because the parties had intended to obtain
a contract through bribing the Kuwati government).
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contract which on the face of the award was held to involve
the payment of bribes. It would then be a matter for
consideration at the enforcement stage whether, although the
arbitrators had jurisdiction to determine the issue, the award
should be enforced because they had exceeded their
jurisdiction in giving effect to an illegal contract or had
misconducted themselves or because enforcement would be
contrary to public policy. . . . Insofar as it involves
determination of questions of fact, that is an everyday feature
of international arbitration .... If much weight were to be
attached to that consideration it is difficult to see that
arbitrators would ever be accorded jurisdiction to determine
issues of illegality.10 6
In light of case law such as this, it now appears to be accepted that
arbitrators have jurisdiction over disputes involving allegations or
evidence of corruption. 07 There are no compelling reasons why this
should not also be the case for money laundering. Indeed, it has been
pointed out that the question often confronting arbitrators and the
party alleging corruption is not jurisdiction but, rather, the nature of
proving the objectionable conduct and, if proved, determining the
consequences of such conduct under the applicable law. 108 This is the
author's experience with respect to money laundering.
Therefore, with respect to the first option as to how an arbitral
tribunal should proceed if faced with a contract involving money
laundering that is valid and enforceable under its governing
substantive law, the widely accepted view supports the conclusion
that the arbitral tribunal should not refuse jurisdiction simply because
of allegations or evidence of money laundering. 0 9
B. INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY
Assuming an arbitral tribunal accepts jurisdiction in such a
situation, should it apply a principle of international public policy to
106. Id. at 128-29 (internal citations omitted).
107. See FOUCHARD, supra note 99, at 355; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 90,
at 143.
108. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 93, at 143.
109. See id.
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hold invalid or unenforceable a contract tainted by money
laundering?
Under most international instruments and national laws, public
policy is one of the few grounds upon which an arbitral award may
be set aside or enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused.' l
Consequently, it is not disputed that arbitrators can depart from the
provisions of the governing substantive law of the contract when to
apply such law would be contrary to public policy and would,
accordingly, imperil the award."1 While the term public policy as it
is used in these instruments refers to a domestic conception of public
policy (i.e., that of the court asked to set aside or refuse enforcement
of the arbitral award), it is generally accepted that when arbitrators
disregard the provisions of the lex contractus they should not be
restricted by any such domestic conception and should take into
consideration the requirements of what has been termed
"transnational" or "truly international" public policy."2 In the ICC
case quoted above, Judge Lagergren stated: "[I]t cannot be contested
that there exists a general principle of law recognized by civilised
nations that contracts which seriously violate bonos mores or
international public policy are invalid or at least unenforceable and
that they cannot be sanctioned by courts or arbitrators.""' 3
The difficult question is how to determine the content of
international public policy as applied by international arbitrators.
While corruption and bribery were for a long time widely used trade
practices encouraged by certain States, the prohibition against
corruption and bribery has now arguably reached the level of a
110. See, e.g., Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, art. V(2)(B), 330 U.N.T.S. 3, 21 U.S.T. 2517;
U.N. Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 18, art.
34(b)(i), U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1302.
111. See FOUCHARD, supra note 99, at 861.
112. See generally P. Lalive, Ordre Public Transnational et Arbitrage
International, 1986 REv. ARB. 329; FOUCHARD, supra note 99, at 860-61; W.
LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION
344-46 (3d ed. 2000).
113. ICC Case No. 1110, Award, reprinted in Wetter, supra note 96, at 293, §
16 (emphasis added).
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principle of international public policy.114 As recently noted by the
International Arbitration Committee of the International Law
Association: "Following the 1997 OECD Convention on Combating
the Bribery of Officials in International Transactions which reflects
the mounting international concern about the prevalence of corrupt
trading practices, it is arguable that there is an international
consensus that corruption and bribery are contrary to international
public policy."' 15
Can the same thing be said of money laundering? As described in
Part II above, the extensive international and national legal
framework that consists of a significant number of international
instruments condemning money laundering and the ever-growing
number of countries criminalizing money laundering have led some
to argue that the prohibition against money laundering is effectively
a principle of international public policy, which arbitrators should
take into consideration. 16
Indeed, the increasingly sophisticated international and national
legal framework for combating money laundering described in Part
II above conveys the impression that the international community at
large considers this type of conduct highly objectionable. In
particular, the FATF's Forty Recommendations appear to have
become an accepted standard, notably through the policy of
blacklisting non-cooperative countries. Arguably, the persistence of
these remaining few should not impede a principle of international
public policy from emerging, since total unanimity for such a
principle to exist has never been required."I7
114. See generally FRANCOIS KNOEPFLER, CORRUPTION ET ARBITRAGE
INTERNATIONAL 359 et seq. (1998); Bruno Oppetit, Le paradoxe de la Corruption
d l'4preuve du Droit du Commerce International, 114 J. DU DROIT INT'L 5 (1987).
115. INT'L LAW ASS'N, COMM. ON INT'L COMMERCIAL ARB., INTERIM REPORT
ON PUBLIC POLICY AS A BAR TO ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL
AWARDS 22 (2000).
116. See Bernardo Cremades & David Cairns, Transnational Public Policy in
International Arbitral Decision-Making, in ICC PAPERS, supra note 2, at 68. At the
same conference, it was suggested by Professor Antonio Crivellaro that money
laundering may have reached the status of an international crime [crimina juris
gentium]. Arbitration Case Law on Bribery, in ICC PAPERS, supra note 2.
117. See FOUCHARD, supra note 99, at 863 ("To require total unanimity would
be to deprive the application of public policy of all meaning in international
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However, this apparent convergence is misleading. There is no
consensus as to precisely what constitutes "money laundering." In
particular, there is no consensus as to the predicate offences upon
which the offence of money laundering may be based.
The case of tax evasion is a good example. Tax evasion has been
made a predicate offence in several Member States of the European
Union, and, when money laundering was first criminalized in Russia
in January 1997, the legislature was concerned exclusively with
operations involving tax evasion and capital flight.118 However,
neither the FATF's Forty Recommendations nor the First or Second
EU Directives specifically require that tax evasion be considered a
predicate offence. 119 Indeed, the extension of the anti-money
laundering legal framework to tax offences has been questioned in
terms of efficacy of the whole system.120 As is noted in Part II above,
while French law criminalizes the laundering of the proceeds from
tax evasion, the law in the United States does not include tax
offences as predicate offences.12
1
On the other hand, an international consensus does exist regarding
certain predicate offences. 122 In light of the large number of countries
(over 170) that have ratified the Vienna Convention, it would appear
that the laundering of the proceeds from drug trafficking is contrary
to a widely accepted norm of international public policy. But what
about white-collar crime, the illegitimate diversion of corporate
arbitration as, by definition, for public policy to come into play, at least one law-
the law which would otherwise apply-must be contrary to the fundamental
conception ofjustice which is reflected by public policy.").
118. See FATF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 14.
119. See Forty Recommendations, supra note 31, at 1; Second EU Directive,
supra note 50, art. I(E).
120. See DALHUISEN, supra 6, at 483. Professor Dalhuisen appears concerned
with the overburdening of financial institutions that such an evolution might entail.
See generally on this issue, P. Alldridge, Are Tax Evasion Offences Predicate
Offences for Money Laundering?, 4 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 350 (2001).
121. See Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, The Tenuous Relationship Between the
Fight Against Money Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance, 93 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 311, 384 (2003).
122. See Forty Recommendations, supra note 31, at 12 (defining "designated
categories of offences" to include fraud, smuggling, piracy, forgery, market
manipulation, insider trading, and various other crimes).
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assets (such as in the example encountered by the author referred to
in Part I above), and certain tax offences?
In sum, it would appear that an arbitral tribunal may indeed apply
a principle of international public policy to hold invalid or
unenforceable a contract involving money laundering that is valid
and enforceable under its governing substantive law. However, the
strength of such a decision when enforcing the award or in the face
of a challenge to the award is likely to depend upon the relevant
national courts' perception of the definition of money laundering
applied by the arbitral tribunal, including the predicate offence upon
which the money laundering is based. The more consistent the
arbitral tribunal's decision is in this regard with the likely perception
of the relevant national courts (which can be discerned from the
international and legal framework on money laundering), the higher
the chances of success in defending and enforcing the arbitral award
before those national courts.
It has been noted that it would often be easier for arbitrators to
resort to mandatory provisions of a law other than the lex contractus
rather than to try to apply a principle of international public policy
and that, in doing so, the burden of proof imposed on the party
alleging the illegality would be diminished.'23 This leads to the third
option open to arbitrators as described below.
C. MANDATORY RULES
The third option, described in Part I above, is the question of
whether an arbitral tribunal faced with a contract involving money
laundering that is valid and enforceable under its governing
substantive law may, assuming it accepts jurisdiction, resort to the
mandatory provisions of a law different than the governing
substantive law agreed to by the parties in the contract. In other
words, in such a situation can arbitrators resort to the so-called
"mandatory rules" method to hold the contract invalid or
unenforceable?
123. See FOUCHARD, supra note 99, at 855 (explaining that adherence to the
rules of one jurisdiction alleviates the difficulties in defining a larger international
public policy).
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At the outset, it is important to distinguish between two kinds of
cases. The first kind is where the arbitral tribunal only takes account
of the prohibition imposed by another law as a fact and then draws
the consequences of this prohibition, if any, under the lex
contractus.124 The second kind is where the arbitral tribunal directly
applies a prohibitive rule of a foreign law to the contract and
overrides the provisions of the lex contractus.'25 The latter is the
mandatory rules method, which has been described as follows:
The mandatory rules method involves identifying rules
which, in their own legal system, reflect essential policy, and
then evaluating, given the closeness of the connections
between the case and that legal system and the 'consequences
of their application or non-application,' if it is appropriate to
apply those rules in the case at hand. 26
While far from being unanimously supported, this method has
nonetheless gained recognition in European courts following its
adoption in Article 7 of the 1980 Rome Convention of the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations ("Rome Convention"). 27 The
mandatory rules method is also recognized in Article 9 of the 1991
Resolution of the Institute of International Law, which provides that:
If regard is to be had to mandatory provisions . .. of a law
other than that of the forum or that chosen by the parties, then
such provisions can only prevent the chosen law from being
applied if there is a close link between the contract and the
country of that law and if they further such aims as are
generally accepted by the international community. 28
In the field of international arbitration, the mandatory rules
method is contentious, as it leads to disregarding the express choice
124. See Pierre Mayer, Mandatory Rules of Law in International Arbitration, 2
ARB. INT'L 274, 281 (1986).
125. See id. at 282-83.
126. FOUCHARD, supra note 99, at 852.
127. See Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 1980
O.J. (L 266) 1, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1492. The United Kingdom, Germany and
Luxembourg have made a reservation with respect to Article 7 of the Rome
Convention.
128. FOUCHARD, supra note 99, at 853.
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of substantive law of the parties. However, as pointed out by one
author, "the pacta sunt servanda principle may have to give way to
more powerful considerations."'' 29 As an example of more powerful
considerations, that author refers to the prohibition of "contracts in
the pursuit of immoral aims, involving corruption or trade in illegal
drugs. 1
30
Regardless of the theoretical debate, arbitral tribunals have been
prepared to apply the mandatory provisions of laws other than the lex
contractus. At times, they have even relied directly upon Article 7 of
the Rome Convention.' Generally, it has been noted that: "Despite
respectable arguments to the contrary, most international arbitral
tribunals would in all likelihood be extremely reluctant to require a
party to perform-or to pay damages for its failure to perform-
when a mandatory national law in effect at the place of performance
forbids such performance." 132
The most striking examples of the application of the mandatory
rules method are found in the area of competition law, where parties
have resisted enforcement of contracts alleging a violation of the
competition provisions of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community'33 or American anti-trust law. 134 This approach is even
encouraged by national courts. For example, in the landmark case of
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the
United States Supreme Court held that arbitrators sitting in Japan
deciding upon a contractual dispute governed by Swiss substantive
129. Mayer, supra note 124, at 284.
130. Id.
131. See Amsterdam Grain Trade Association, Award of January 11, 1982, 1983
Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 158, 160. The award states: "appeal-arbitrators could give
effect to mandatory provisions of the law of another country, if a close link exists
between the case and that country; in so deciding, the nature and extent of these
provisions must be taken into account, as well as the consequences of application
or nonapplication." Id.
132. CRAIG ET AL., supra note 112, at 341 (emphasis added).
133. February 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 573, pt. 3.
134. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2000).
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law were competent to apply the provisions of American anti-trust
law. 135
In sum, therefore, it appears to be accepted, at least to a degree,
that arbitrators may take into consideration mandatory provisions of
laws other than the lex contractus and that this approach may be used
with respect to mandatory provisions prohibiting money laundering.
If one follows the description of the mandatory rules method first
quoted above, one must consider the closeness of that other law to
the case and the consequences of application or non-application of
the prohibition. In matters of money laundering, the laws that
arguably appear most closely connected to the case are the law of the
place of performance, the national law of each of the parties, and the
law of the seat of the arbitration.
The connection of the case with the law of the place of
performance is obvious. The consequences of non-application of
relevant prohibitive provisions of the law of the place of performance
regarding money laundering to a contract tainted by money
laundering are that the arbitrators would be allowing the relevant
parties to carry out criminalized activities in that country. It is
interesting in this regard to consider the decision of the House of
Lords in Regazzoni v. KC. Sethia, Ltd.13 6 In this case, Regazzoni, a
Swiss resident, contracted with K.C. Sethia, an English company, to
export goods from India to South Africa.'37 The contract was
governed by English substantive law and contained an arbitration
clause.138 K.C. Sethia refused to perform the contract, alleging that
the Government of India had prohibited exportation of goods to
South Africa because of apartheid.13 9 Regazzoni commenced
arbitration, and the case made its way to the House of Lords. 140 The
135. 473 U.S. 614, 638-39 (1985) (holding that the expansion of international
trade and the use of international arbitration to resolve disputes creates situations
where countries must occasionally "cede jurisdiction of a claim arising under
domestic law to a foreign or transnational tribunal").
136. [1957] 3 All E.R. 286.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 290.
139. Id. at 286.
140. Id. at 287.
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House of Lords refused to enforce the contract because it
contemplated performance of acts in violation of the laws of a
friendly country.141 Viscount Simonds stated in obiter: "For an
English court will not enforce a penal law at the suit of a foreign
state, yet it would be surprising if it would enforce a contract which
required the commission of a crime in that state.' 142
As for the national laws of the parties, a survey conducted of the
published arbitral awards dealing with mandatory rules revealed that
arbitrators are more reluctant to apply the provisions of the law of the
parties than those of the law of the place of performance. 143 The
approach should perhaps be different in matters of money
laundering, which involve committing a criminal offence. It is an
accepted principle of international law that a State's criminal
jurisdiction extends to its territory and to its nationals. 144
Accordingly, a State could claim to have provisions regarding money
laundering that regulate not only activities within its territory, but
also activities of its nationals outside its borders (it should be noted
that not all States claim to have criminal law regulating conduct of
their nationals abroad).145 Should arbitrators refuse to apply such
prohibitive provisions, this would allow the parties to frustrate such a
State's public policy. 146 This should be sufficient for arbitrators to
take such provisions into consideration.
Finally, there are the mandatory provisions of the law of the seat
of the arbitration. The law of the seat is not necessarily closely
connected to the case. 47 However, there are reasons why arbitrators
should take the mandatory provisions of the law of the seat into
account. An award enforcing a contract tainted by money laundering
141. Id. at 286.
142. Id. at 292 (emphasis added).
143. See Mayer, supra note 124, at 283 (construing Yves Derains, Les normes
d'application immddiate dans la jurisprudence internationale).
144. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 299-302
(6th ed. 2003).
145. Seeid.at301.
146. See id. (asserting the importance of a State's right to adopt principles it
considers "best and most suitable" in order to regulate criminal activity).
147. See id. at 290.
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where such money laundering is prohibited by the law of the seat
would expose the award to a challenge at the seat and to refusal of
any enforcement of the award at the seat. 48 Ignoring this risk would
be difficult to reconcile with the duty of the arbitral tribunal under
the rules of some arbitral institutions to ensure that the award is
"enforceable at law. ' 149 Moreover, an arbitrator that knowingly
enforces a contract tainted by money laundering prohibited by the
law of the seat runs the risk of committing a criminal offence at the
seat by "facilitating" the operation.1 50
Therefore, the arbitral tribunal may indeed use the mandatory rules
method (i.e., giving precedence to the mandatory provisions of a law
other than the lex contractus) to hold invalid or unenforceable a
contract involving money laundering that is valid and enforceable
under the lex contractus. In doing so, the arbitral tribunal should
have particular regard for the mandatory provisions of the law of the
place of performance and of the law of the seat of the arbitration.
Arguably, it should also have regard for the national laws of the
parties. In any event, the arbitral tribunal should consider the
consequences of the application or non-application of such
mandatory provisions prohibiting money laundering on the
enforceability of the award and the award's ability to withstand a
challenge.
148. See id.
149. See, e.g., International Chamber of Commerce, Rules of Arbitration, at 31,
art. 35 (1998), 36 I.L.M. 1604 ("In all matters not expressly provided for in these
Rules, the Court and the Arbitral Tribunal shall act in the spirit of these Rules and
shall make every effort to make sure that the Award is enforceable at law.");
London Court of International Arbitration, Arbitration; Rules, Clauses & Costs,
art. 32.2 ("In all matters not expressly provided for in these Rules, the LCIA Court,
the Arbitral Tribunal and the parties shall act in the spirit of these Rules and shall
make every reasonable effort to ensure that an award is legally enforceable."),
available at http://www.lcia-arbitration.com/arb/uk.htm#recom (last visited Sept.
15, 2005).
150. See Pierre-Yves Tschanz and Jean-Marie Vulliemin, Chronique de
Jurisprudence Etrang~re: Suisse, 2001 REv. ARB. 885, 907, n.64 (expressing
doubt that the arbitrators would commit such an offence). But see Homayoon
Arfazadeh, Considrations Pragmatiques sur la Comptence des Arbitres et du
Juge en Mati~re de Corruption, 19 ASA BULL. 672, 683 (2001).
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CONCLUSION
The introduction to this article refers to the impact on international
arbitration of the expanding legal framework on money laundering
and how this has become a topic of growing prominence in the field
of arbitration. 5' Indeed, a necessary consequence of the expansion of
the legal framework to combat money laundering is that more
commercial transactions will run afoul of the framework's provisions
and more disputes arising from such transactions will end up before
international arbitral tribunals.
Where the contract at issue involves money laundering that is
proven to the satisfaction of the arbitral tribunal, and the contract is
invalid or unenforceable under the substantive law governing the
contract, there should be no real debate. The only issue might be
whether the arbitral tribunal should accept jurisdiction over the
dispute. However, as noted in Part III above, it now appears to be
widely accepted that an arbitral tribunal should accept jurisdiction to
decide such disputes.
Where there should be debate, with good reason, is when the
contract at issue involves money laundering, which is proven to the
satisfaction of the arbitral tribunal, but the contract would be valid
and enforceable under its governing substantive law. It is worth
repeating the view referred to in Part I above that an arbitral tribunal
should not "turn a blind eye" but, rather, should find a way to refuse
to give effect to such a highly objectionable contract.'52 If so, how
should an arbitral tribunal proceed?
For the reasons given, the widely accepted view would appear to
be that refusing jurisdiction simply because of allegations or
evidence of money laundering should not be an option. However,
two options open to an arbitral tribunal in this situation are: (i) to
apply a principle of international public policy, or (ii) to give
151. See supra Part I (explaining how the process of money laundering involves
the use of contracts or commercial disputes which use arbitration as a means of
dispute resolution).
152. See Westacre Invs. Co. v. Jugoimport-SPDR Holding Co. Ltd., [1998] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 111, 131 (Q.B.) ("The public policy of sustaining international
arbitration awards on the facts of this case outweighs the public policy in
discouraging international commercial corruption.").
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precedence to the mandatory provisions of another law over the
governing substantive law of the contract. Each one of these options
has its strengths and weaknesses for the reasons stated above.
Ultimately, the strength of a decision to employ either option will
depend upon how it is perceived by any national courts faced with a
request to enforce or set aside the arbitral award.
In the case of applying a principle of international public policy to
hold the contract invalid or unenforceable, this will likely depend
upon the relevant national court's perception of the definition of
money laundering applied by the arbitral tribunal, including the
predicate offence upon which the money laundering is based. The
more consistent the arbitral tribunal's decision is in this regard with
the likely perception of those national courts (which can be discerned
from the international and legal framework on money laundering),
the higher the chances of success in defending and enforcing the
arbitral award before those national courts.
In the case of using the mandatory rules method to hold the
contract invalid or unenforceable, the perception of the national court
from the jurisdiction upon whose mandatory provisions the arbitral
tribunal relied in making its award is likely to be more favorable to
the award. In any event, the arbitrators must take into consideration
any duty they have with respect to the enforceability of the award
and the possibility, however remote, of them committing an offence
at the seat of arbitration by rendering an award that holds valid and
enforceable a contract involving money laundering.
The author expects that the discussion regarding the impact on
international arbitration of the legal framework on money laundering
will continue for some time, particularly if the legal framework
continues to evolve at a rapid pace. Not a great deal has been written
on this subject, and there are many issues ripe for further
consideration that are not dealt with here: Which party should bear
the burden of proof (or of evidence), are any presumptions
applicable, and does this burden shift at any point? What should be
the standard of proof? How should an arbitral tribunal address
differences in predicate offences? How should the origin of the
criminal proceeds be proven? Should the arbitral tribunal raise
money laundering as an issue of its own motion and, if so, what is
the threshold for doing so? Do the arbitrators have an obligation to
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disclose or report allegations or evidence of money laundering and, if
so, to whom? The author looks forward to further discussion of these
issues.
